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Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA
or the Act), children with disabilities are entitled to a free,
appropriate public education (FAPE). The Act provides a procedural
safeguard for children and their parents seeking to challenge a state
or local educational agency’s educational plan for the child in the
form of a due process hearing presided over by a hearing officer or
an administrative law judge (ALJ). This article describes the current
case law concerning the authority of ALJs to sanction parties and
attorneys for misconduct during these special education proceedings.
Due to the limited number of cases available on the topic and the lack
of analysis in literature, this article seeks to offer perspective on the
types of cases in which sanctions were used and against whom the
officers issued them, in attempt to provide practitioners and pro se
petitioners guidance on how to prevent the issuance of a sanction
against them.
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is a descriptive assessment of the current case law
concerning the power of hearing officers and administrative law
judges (ALJ)1 to sanction parties and attorneys for misconduct in the
context of special education proceedings conducted under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or the Act).2
These proceedings are termed “due process hearings” under IDEA. 3
Given the number of cases discussed herein, the variations in state
administrative law and procedure, and the fact that many special
* Salma Khaleq received her Juris Doctor from DePaul University College
of Law and is licensed in the State of Illinois. She received her Bachelors Degree in
Political Science from Marquette University magna cum laude. Salma has worked
in health care and insurance regulation since 2006. Currently, she works for Health
Care Service Corporation, a licensee of the Blue Cross Blue Shield brand in four
states, in strategy and implementation of provisions of the Patient Protections and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA). Thank you to Prof. Mark Weber, St. Vincent de
Paul Professor of Law, for his guidance and support throughout the writing of this
Article.
1

In some states, hearing officers are referred to as administrative law
judges (ALJs). For the sake of simplicity, this Article will utilize the term ALJ to
refer to both hearing officers and ALJs.
2
20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2005).
3
Id. § 1415(f).
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education opinions are unpublished, it is difficult to ascertain a trend
in the ways in which ALJs have used their discretionary authority.
However, understanding the precedents in this area of law can aid in
determining one’s obligations as a practitioner in the field of special
education, as a parent party bringing a claim pro se, or as a student of
special education law.
The sanctioning authority of judges sitting in federal or state
court is unquestionable. However, federal district courts have cast
doubt on the authority of ALJs to impose sanctions.4 Although
sitting in a quasi-judicial capacity, ALJs have been delegated specific
statutory authorities, whether under state or federal law, which
specify the extent to which they may act as “judges” in hearings or
proceedings. Few states have explicitly extended sanctioning
authority to special education ALJs operating under state law.5 There
is an immense amount of variation from state to state in this regard,
and a comprehensive review of the sanctioning authority of state
ALJs in general is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, this
article focuses on the authority of ALJs in special education. As of
the date of this article, the only writing available on the topic is a
2006 article by Professor Perry A. Zirkel on remedial authorities of
hearing officers under IDEA, which includes a section on sanctioning
powers but offers no conclusions.6
This article intends to offer perspective on the factual
circumstances surrounding the application of a sanction in special
education cases and attempts to delineate certain categories of
sanctions employed as well as the parties against whom they have
been granted. Part II of this article will discuss the relevant portions
of the federal law pertaining to education of individuals with
disabilities and the authority of hearing officers under the Act. Parts
III through VI will look at the types of sanctions imposed by ALJs,
specifically the application of monetary penalties, dismissals of cases

4

GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW, PERSPECTIVES,
PREVENTATIVE MEASURES 130 (Richard G. Johnson ed., 3d ed. 2004) (citing
case law from the Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits).
5
See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 340.1725e(1)(e) (1994); CAL. GOV’T. CODE §
11455.30(a) (Deering 2010); 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1170(b) (2001).
6
Perry A. Zirkel, The Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review Officers
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 401,
421-22 (2006).
AND
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with or without prejudice, refusal to admit evidence, refusal to allow
representation, and contempt sanctions. Part VII will provide an
evaluation of the case law, focusing on measures practitioners and
pro se petitioners can take to prevent the issuance of sanctions
against them.
II. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (IDEA)
Under IDEA, children with disabilities are entitled to a free,
appropriate public education (FAPE).7 State education agencies
(SEAs) are charged with ensuring that local education agencies
(LEAs or school districts) and other state agencies receiving federal
funding for special education through IDEA comply with the Act’s
statutory requirements.8 Among those requirements is that an
individualized education plan is put in place for each disabled child
with the participation of his or her parent(s) or guardian(s).9 This
plan is subject to periodic review and requires parental consent.10
Numerous procedural safeguards exist to ensure that parents can fully
utilize their rights under the Act.11
One of these rights is that parents may request a due process
hearing when a dispute arises between parents or guardians of an
eligible child and the local school district regarding the
individualized education plan or other facets of the child’s
entitlement to a FAPE under the Act.12 The SEA or LEA must
conduct an impartial due process hearing in which each party may be
represented by counsel and has the opportunity to present evidence
and witnesses on its behalf.13 IDEA permits each state to create its
own hearing procedures and choose the review process. The limits
placed on the selection of a hearing officer in the federal statute
include that he/she not be an employee of the state or local
educational agency, not have a “personal or professional” conflict of
interest, possess the requisite knowledge of IDEA and state special
7

20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1).
Id. § 1412(a)(11).
9
Id. § 1412(a)(4), § 1436(a)(3).
10
Id. § 1436(b), (e).
11
Id. § 1412(a)(6).
12
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6).
13
Id. § 1415(f).
8
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education regulations, and possess the ability and know-how to
conduct hearings and write decisions in accordance with standard
legal practice.14 Other procedural considerations for these hearings
are a matter of state law. For example states can choose either a onetier review process or a two-tier review process.15 In a one-tier
process there is a single review by an administrative law judge or
hearing officer appointed by the SEA, and then any appeal is filed in
state or federal court.16 In a two-tier process, there is an appealslevel review officer or panel provided by the SEA that reviews the
lower-tier decisions if they are appealed.17 These review decisions
may be appealed to court.18 For the purposes of this article, the
sanctioning authority of both types of hearing officers is treated in
concert.
Like any legal proceeding, the special education hearing
process may be subject to abuse by either of the parties involved.
Strategic legal maneuvering or neglect by attorneys may lead to
waste of time and resources and require disciplinary action. IDEA is
silent regarding the sanctioning authority of the individual hearing
officers. The United States Department of Education, which
administers IDEA, has declared that state law dictates whether
hearing officers can issue sanctions and penalties.19 This article’s
review of the case law examines state-specific precedents allowing
hearing officers to sanction one party or another in special education
cases. The sanctions range from monetary fines and fees to dismissal
of a case with prejudice or exclusion of evidence.

14

Id. § 1415(f)(3)(A)(i)-(iv).
NATIONAL DISSEMINATION CENTER FOR CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES
(NICHCY),
THE
DUE
PROCESS
HEARING,
IN
DETAIL,
http://www.nichcy.org/EducateChildren/disputes/pages/hearings-details.aspx (last
visited Jan. 26, 2012); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (allowing for review of finding
by a local education agencies to a state education agency).
16
Id. § 1415(g)(1).
17
Id. § 1415(g)(2).
18
Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
19
Letter to Armstrong, 28 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP.
303 (OSEP June 11, 1997).
15
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III. MONETARY PENALTIES AS SANCTIONS
Of the fourteen cases discussed in this article, seven concern
the use of monetary penalties. IDEA allows courts to award
attorney’s fees to the prevailing parent in a hearing and SEAs if the
hearing request is frivolous or brought for an improper purpose,20 but
ALJs in the cases discussed here were not exercising this authority.
Instead, in each case in which sanctions were imposed, the ALJs took
it on themselves to award the school districts payments either as a
general penalty for the parents’ conduct or as reparation for wasted
attorney time.
A. Sanctions Imposed Against Parents’ Representatives
In a special education decision in Michigan, the parents of a
student were ordered to pay the opposing counsel’s costs of $308.86
based on the parents’ counsel’s “unexcusable failure to communicate
with the [School] District's counsel in a timely fashion,” and the state
hearing officer dismissed their case with prejudice.21 The parents’
counsel attempted to withdraw the due process hearing request two
days before the deadline for exchange of witness and exhibit lists,
and failed to return calls from the district’s counsel the following day
requesting clarification regarding the scope of the withdrawal. 22 The
school district’s counsel had prepared witnesses and exhibits for the
hearing by the deadline and provided them to parent’s counsel.
Counsel for the parents defended his actions by saying he was “busy
with other work.”23 In issuing the monetary sanction, the hearing
officer relied on the state administrative code giving him the
authority “to control the conduct of the parties or participants in the
hearing for the purpose of ensuring an orderly procedure”24 as well

20

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).
Bd. of Educ. of Hillsdale Cmty. Schs., 32 INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 162, 510-11 (Mich. SEA 1999).
22
Id. at 508.
23
Id. at 509.
24
MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 340.1725e(1)(e) (1994).
21
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federal guidelines in IDEA which give hearing officers broad
authority over the hearing process.25
In Indiana, a second-tier review officer upheld a first-tier
hearing officer’s decision to issue a financial sanction of $500
payable to the school district for “sham objections” and egregious
delays by the petitioner’s attorney.26 Counsel for the petitioners had
failed to comply with discovery requests, causing unnecessary delay
of discovery proceedings.27 The first-level hearing officer believed
this conduct was an attempt by the lawyer to hide information about
the recent hospitalization of the attorney’s clients’ child.28 The
reviewing officer relied on statutory authority,29 which allows for
imposition of sanctions as well as the Indiana Administrative
Procedures Act (IAPA). IAPA states that discretionary decisions by
administrative law judges cannot be reversed without a showing that
the decision to issue a sanction was “arbitrary and capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”30
Based on this standard, the reviewing officer found that the first-tier
hearing officer’s discretionary imposition of the monetary sanction
was reasonable.31 The reviewing officer clarified that the $500
sanction was to be paid by counsel and not the petitioners because the
attorney in this case was the child’s stepfather.32
A hearing officer in Minnesota relied on the Indiana decision
above and ordered a student’s attorney to pay $2,000 to the school
district as a disciplinary sanction for pursuing a summary judgment
motion “without factual basis, upon unsupported and distorted facts
and upon illogical arguments.”33 The officer reasoned that he
25
Bd. of Educ. of Hillsdale Cmty. Schs., 32 INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. at 510 (relying on 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)).
26
Indianapolis Pub. Sch. 21 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L.
REP. 423, 426 (Ind. SEA 1994).
27
Id. at 425.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 426 (citing IND. CODE § 4-21.5-3-8 (1991)).
30
Indianapolis Pub. Sch. 21 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L.
REP. at 426 (citing 511 IND. ADMIN. CODE 7-15-5 (repealed 2000)).
31
IND. CODE § 4-21.5-3-8 (1991).
32
Indianapolis Pub. Sch. 21 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L.
REP. at 426.
33
Dist. City 1 & Dist. City 2 Pub. Sch., 24 INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 1081, 1886 (Minn. SEA 1996).
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derived his authority to impose sanctions, similar to those imposed
pursuant to Rule 11 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, from
the “implied authority” that hearing officers have “to control the
conduct of the hearing and persons appearing there.”34
This authority was upheld in another Minnesota case where a
hearing officer ordered a parent's attorney to pay $5,000 as a sanction
for filing a frivolous fourth hearing request and to compensate for the
school district’s costs in defending the action.35 The hearing officer
found that plaintiffs had previously brought three hearing requests on
matters that were already under administrative review or had been
fully litigated.36 A second-tier reviewing officer affirmed the
dismissal and the award of sanctions but reduced the monetary
penalty to $2,432 because those were the actual costs incurred by the
defendant.37 The case went before a federal magistrate judge, which
issued a report and recommendation finding that the reviewing
officer had the authority to assess sanctions against the plaintiff.38
The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation upholding the sanction and ruled for the school
district.39 The court cited the state regulation giving hearing officers
their sanctioning authority, which also allowed them to “do the
additional things necessary to comply” with special education rules.40
In an unpublished California appellate decision, Poway
Unified School District v. Stewart, the court affirmed an order by a
hearing officer granting a motion to sanction the parent-party for
improper notice of her withdrawal of a request for a hearing. 41 The
California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) ordered the
parent to pay $3,091.25 in sanctions and costs.42 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals relied on a state statute that authorizes an
34

Dist. City 1 & Dist. City 2 Pub. Sch., 24 INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. at 1886.
35
Moubry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 696, No. 98-2246, 32 INDIVIDUALS
WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 90, 283 (D. Minn. 2000).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 284.
40
MINN. R. 3525.4100 (2000) (repealed 2004); Moubry v. Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 696, 32 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. at 284.
41
No. D048901, 2007 WL 1620766, *1 (Cal. Ct. App., Jun. 6, 2007).
42
Id.
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administrative officer to “order a party . . . to pay reasonable
expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by another party as a
result of bad faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely
intended to cause unnecessary delay . . . . ”43 The court dismissed the
totality of the parent’s arguments and affirmed the award of
sanctions.44
Another California case, appealed to federal district court,
involved an ALJ’s monetary sanction of the petitioners’ attorneys for
filing a motion that was “completely without merit” and in “bad
faith.”45 The attorneys for the student’s parents had filed a Motion
for Clarification Regarding the Date of the Hearing after refusing to
acknowledge that opposing counsel for the school district had not
waived the resolution session46 since the parties had not executed a
written waiver as required by IDEA.47 Finding that the motion was
without merit for having misinterpreted the governing law and
neglecting to cite to authority or make good faith arguments, the ALJ
awarded sanctions in the amount of $300.48 On appeal to the federal
district court, the court upheld the award of sanctions as “supported
by a preponderance of the evidence” and denied the petitioner’s
request to reverse.49 The court did not expressly discuss the
sanctioning authority of the ALJ, but its decision to deny plaintiff’s
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11455.30(a) (Deering 2010).
Poway, 2007 WL 1620766 at *2. See also Poway Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Stewart, No. D050202, 2008 WL 607530 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar 06, 2008) (case was
subsequently appealed and came before the same court again after a bench warrant
was issued due to the parent’s failure to pay the necessary fees. The court again
affirmed its previous ruling and dismissed the parent’s appeal).
45
K.S. ex rel. P.S. v. Fremont Unified Sch. Dist., 545 F. Supp. 2d 995,
1009 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
46
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B) (2006) (Requiring that a local education
agency convene a meeting between parents and relvent IEP team members bedore
conducting a due process hearing). A resolution session is to be scheduled by the
school district within fifteen days of the filing of a due process complaint. At the
session, the parents, school district and other individuals familiar with the child’s
IEP meet in an effort to resolve the dispute. This is conducted unless both parties
agree in writing to waive the session. If the school district fails to resolve the
dispute within 30 days of the filing of the complaint, the due process hearing may
then take place.
47
K.S. ex rel. P.S. v. Fremont Unified Sch. Dist., 545 F. Supp. 2d at 1009.
48
Id. at 1001, 1009.
49
Id. at 1010.
43
44
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request to reverse sanctions implies that it found that the ALJ had the
requisite authority to sanction parties in the proceeding.50
B. Rejecting the Imposition of Monetary Sanctions
Monetary sanctioning authority was rejected in New Mexico
where an administrative law judge had ordered parents to make their
child available for a medical evaluation, and the parents continued to
refuse and delay evaluation.51 Although the parents eventually
complied, the ALJ granted a school district motion for summary
judgment and recommended that the district’s attorney’s fees be paid
by the parents as a sanction, even though the hearing officer
concluded that hearing officers do not have the authority to award
fees.52
On review, the administrative appeals officer noted that the
IDEA provides the statutory authority for a “court of competent
jurisdiction” to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.53
Neither federal nor New Mexico laws governing due process
hearings give hearing officers or ALJs the authority to award
attorney’s fees.54 The appeals officer conceded that some states have
allowed this practice, but stated that New Mexico has not chosen to
give its administrative officers this power.55 The officer went on to
state that a hearing officer does not even have the authority to make
the recommendation that a court award monetary sanctions.56 Thus,
the appeals officer vacated the recommendation as inappropriate.57
However the officer made a cautionary note for parents who disobey
orders issued in the administrative process, stating that the 2004
Amendments to IDEA, although inapplicable to the case at bar,
50
The implication is derived from the court’s review of the proceedings
and the arguments made by the parties, and its ultimate conclusion that sanctions
were supported by the evidence.
51
Las Cruces Pub. Sch., 44 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L.
REP. 205, 1070-71 (N.M. SEA 2005).
52
Id. at 1071.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 1072.
56
Las Cruces Pub. Sch., 44 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L.
REP. at 1072.
57
Id.
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permit courts to award attorney’s fees if the parent uses the
administrative or court process for any “improper purpose, such as to
harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost
of litigation.”58
IV. DISMISSALS OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISMISSALS WITH PREJUDICE
AS SANCTIONS
In four cases surveyed below, the hearing officers dismissed
special education proceedings in order to sanction attorneys for filing
the same complaint multiple times and for various types of behavior
that caused delays, such as refusals to authorize a release of
information for a child’s records, cooperate in the proceedings, or
honor requests for information. Dismissals with prejudice, whereby
a future hearing request is disallowed, were also considered in two of
these cases.
A. Sanctions Imposed Against Parents’ Representatives
In an examination of sanctioning power, a Texas hearing
officer looked at state and federal law to determine whether dismissal
of a case with prejudice was within his authority.59 In this case, the
officer found that a parents’ counsel engaged in “sanctionable
conduct” by filing and dismissing the same special education due
process request four times so as to “manipulate the hearing settings
and abuse the hearing process.”60 After the third dismissal request,
counsel for the parents explained to the hearing officer that the
dismissals and re-filings were due to counsel’s inability to locate an
expert witness for the hearing. The attorney was warned that if there
were a fourth instance of re-filing and request for dismissal, sanctions
would be imposed.61 The hearing date was pushed back to allow
counsel to locate an expert, but a day before the scheduled hearing
the parents’ counsel filed another request for dismissal.62 A hearing
58

Id. at 1073.
Ingram Indep. Sch. Dist., 43 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L.
REP. 124 (Tex. SEA 2004).
60
Id. at 554.
61
Id.
62
Id.
59
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on sanctions was held and the hearing officer dismissed the case with
prejudice, finding that this would be an appropriate sanction to
impose, given counsel’s abuse of the system.63
In support of this decision, the hearing officer cited a
provision of the Texas Administrative Code that granted him the
authority to apply sanctions “as necessary to maintain an orderly
hearing process.”64 The hearing officer reasoned that since the
Administrative Code failed to provide guidance on the nature of the
sanctioning authority, the hearing officer could rely on the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure, which the state agency for special
education has made applicable to these hearings.65 The officer stated
that Texas Rule 215 makes a wide variety of sanctions available to
judges in Texas, such as orders denying further discovery, orders
striking pleadings, orders for contempt of court, and orders awarding
attorney’s fees.66 The officer turned to case law to find that hearing
officers act in a “quasi-judicial capacity”, and thus, like courts, they
have inherent powers necessary to protect the integrity of the hearing
process.67 However, the officer rejected a hearing officer’s authority
to issue most of the Rule 215 sanctions in special education
proceedings.68 Instead, the officer concluded that an appropriate and
“just” sanction within his authority would be dismissal with
prejudice.69
In a Michigan case, a hearing officer granted a school
district’s motion to dismiss the case with prejudice due to the
parent’s delays and refusal to cooperate in the proceedings. 70 The
case involved parties that previously entered into a settlement
agreement regarding a child’s IEP (“Individualized Education
63

Id.
Ingram Indep. Sch. Dist., 43 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L.
REP. at 555; see 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1170(b) (2001).
65
Id. at 555 (relying on 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1185(d) (2001) for the
proposition stated).
66
Ingram Indep. Sch. Dist., 43 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L.
REP. at 555; Tex. R. Civ. P. 215.
67
Ingram Indep. Sch. Dist., 43 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L.
REP. at 555.
68
Id. at 556.
69
Id. at 557.
70
Okemos Pub. Schs., 29 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP.
677, 683 (Mich. SEA 1998).
64
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Program”), and the parent requested a due process hearing on issues
not included in the settlement.71 Unrepresented by counsel, the
parent refused to participate in pre-hearing conferences, ignored
filings or sought extensions at the last minute, and offered no
explanations for her failure to make deadlines or retain counsel.72
The officer looked to federal and state court rules to find instances
where dismissals were warranted, but ultimately, relied on a
Michigan state regulation,73 which allows hearing officers broad
discretion over the conduct of a special education hearing, as well as
on IDEA, to issue the dismissal with prejudice in this case.74
In an Ohio state appellate case, the court reviewed a hearing
officer’s decision to dismiss, with prejudice, a parents’ claim to
review their child’s IEP because they failed to provide their child’s
medical and psychological records.75
Although the Ohio
76
Administrative Code
does not include express provisions
authorizing a hearing officer to dismiss an action, the appellate court
found that an administrative hearing officer “is vested with implied
powers similar to those of a court” since the proceeding is “quasijudicial in nature and consists of a hearing resembling a judicial
trial.”77 However, even though a court would have the authority to
dismiss a complaint as a sanction, the appellate court noted that a
dismissal with prejudice is an “extremely harsh sanction” and held
that lesser sanctions should be used when possible in light of the facts
of this case.78 The court overturned the sanction and remanded the
case for further proceedings.79

71

Id. at 677.
Id. at 683.
73
MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 340.1725e(1)(c) (1994).
74
Okemos Pub. Schs., 29 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP.
at 683 (referring to IDEA provision 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2005)).
75
Stancourt v. Worthington City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 841 N.E.2d 812,
816 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
76
OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3301-51-08(F), (H) (2002).
77
Stancourt, 841 N.E.2d at 830.
78
Id. at 830-31 (quoting Schreiner v. Karson, 369 N.E.2d 800, 803 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1977)).
79
Stancourt, 841 N.E.2d at 831.
72

14
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B. Warning Parents’ Representatives of Future Sanctions
In a case from New Hampshire, a hearing officer ordered the
parents of a child to execute forms authorizing a release of records
about their child.80 The district had requested the parents to release
documents regarding their child, who had been evaluated by a
number of professionals and agencies for the purpose of preparation
for a due process hearing.81 The parents refused, claiming privilege,
and the district filed a motion to compel pre-hearing discovery.82 In
granting the motion, the hearing officer warned the parents that
further refusal to sign the requisite documents would result in a
dismissal of their due process hearing.83 The officer relied on
another New Hampshire special education case, In re Caroline T.,
where the officer had considered dismissing the parents’ case for
refusing to sign release forms but ultimately declined to do so.84
Instead the hearing officer in that case issued an order compelling the
parents to comply with a district’s discovery order, warning that
further failure to comply would result in imposition of a sanction.85
V. REFUSAL TO ADMIT FACTS OR DOCUMENTS INTO EVIDENCE
Among the most commonly used sanctions in typical court
cases is the exclusion of evidence. In the special education context,
two cases involved excluding evidence for failure to offer it in a
timely manner as required by the procedural rules governing the
adjudication under state law. One appellate panel review of the
hearing officer’s decision concluded that each hearing officer has
broad discretion in the conduct of the proceedings, including whether
or not to allow in certain evidence.86

80

Epsom Sch. Dist., 31 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP.
120, 445 (N.H. SEA 1999).
81
Id. at 444.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 445.
84
Id. at 444; In re Caroline T., 16 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC.
L. REP. 1340 (N.H. SEA 1990).
85
Id. at 1341.
86
Wissahickon Sch. Dist., 26 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L.
REP. 1370, 1372 (Penn. SEA 1997).
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In a due process hearing in Tennessee, an administrative law
judge issued a pre-trial order compelling a school district to disclose
certain documents within five business days before the hearing.87
The district failed to provide the documents in a timely fashion and
refused proffer of the parents’ documents.88 In ruling on the parent’s
request for contempt against the school district, the ALJ stated that
pursuant to state statute, he had “no powers to fine or jail anyone” as
a sanction for conduct.89 Instead, the ALJ reasoned that the only
remedy that would be available to him in this case would be to refuse
to allow the school district to enter any documents into evidence if
they were submitted at a later date.90
VI. ALLOWING PROCEEDING TO CONTINUE WITHOUT
REPRESENTATION
One special education case involved the imposition of a rare
sanction by a hearing officer, forcing the petitioner to proceed
without representation.91 An appellate review of this decision
declared that this was a harsh and unreasonable sanction.92
A Maine federal district court review of a special education
case resulted in admonishment of a hearing officer for having
allowed a due process proceeding to continue without the pro se
parent party present.93 The court noted that the parent representative
requested multiple continuances during the proceedings on numerous
grounds including that the parent had developed a “serious illness.”94
The hearing officer seemed to have assumed that the parent was
feigning illness to obtain a continuance for her case, given that the
hearing officer contacted her at various times to obtain

87

Smith Cnty. Sch. Sys., 27 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L.
REP. 764, 764 (Tenn. SEA 1998).
88
Id. at 775.
89
Id. at 766; TENN. CODE. ANN. § 4-5-301 (1998).
90
Smith Cnty. Sch. Sys., 27 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L.
REP. at 766.
91
Millay ex rel YRM v. Surry Sch. Dep’t, 707 F. Supp. 2d 56, 65 n.3 (D.
Me. 2010).
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
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documentation from her medical doctor.95 Due to her lack of
communication and the belief on the part of the hearing officer that
she had failed to provide proof of a medical evaluation for her illness,
the officer allowed the proceeding to continue without the parent’s
presence.96
Although the parent was later able to provide
documentation stating that she had developed acute bronchitis during
the time period in question, the hearing officer had already allowed
the school district to present its case-in-chief in its entirety without
cross-examination.97 The district court stated that this was in effect a
“sanction” which had “turned out to be extreme.”98 The court stated
that the hearing officer should have continued the hearing for a few
days to determine whether the parent was indeed sick and if not, then
“impos[ed] a carefully devised sanction” making sure to sanction the
pro se parent and not penalize the student.99
VII. CONTEMPT SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DUE
PROCESS DECISIONS
In contrast to the cases discussed above which sanctioned
misconduct occurring during the proceedings, in the case discussed
below, the parents requested the issuance of a sanction to force
implementation of a final decision previously rendered against a
school district.100
At the conclusion of a special education
proceeding, the decision made by the ALJ is considered final,
although the parties can still appeal the decision to a state or federal
court.101 Generally, a party that is aggrieved by the ALJ’s decision
must exhaust state administrative procedures before bringing a civil
action in state or federal court.102 Although there is no specific
provision addressing enforcement of hearing officer decisions in
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Id.
Millay, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 65 n.3.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 64 n.3.
100
Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 32 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUC. L. REP. 128, 411 (Cal. 2000).
101
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1) (2005).
102
An aggrieved party in this context is the losing party at the due process
hearing. See Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 1270, 1272 (4th Cir. 1987).
96
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IDEA, case law has indicated that parties seeking to compel
enforcement of the final decision made by the ALJ may appeal
directly to state or federal courts and are not obligated to exhaust
remedies.103 Another way to enforce ALJ decisions is through the
state educational agency.104 In New Jersey, for example, since ALJs
do not retain jurisdiction after a final decision is rendered,
enforcement of the decision must be accomplished by the state
educational agency.105 The case below was brought by the parents
before a hearing officer to compel enforcement through use of
contempt proceedings.106
In California, a hearing officer denied a request to initiate
contempt proceedings against a school district107 for failure to
comply with orders in a previous special education decision to
reimburse parents for unilateral placement and services.108 The
hearing officer found that he had the requisite authority, under
California regulations, to “initiate contempt sanctions against a
person in the superior court in and for the county where the hearing is
being conducted.”109 This may be done in response to disobedience
of a lawful order or failure to comply with an order.110 However,
there must be a showing of “bad faith actions or tactics that are
frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay” pursuant to
California’s Code of Civil Procedure.111 The hearing officer could
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Id. at 1272-73.
See Theodore A. Sussan, Enforcing Administrative Law Special
Education Decisions During the Appeal Process, 222 N.J. LAW. 52, 53 (June
2003).
105
Id.
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Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 32 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUC. L. REP. at 410.
107
As demonstrated by cases outlined in this Article, requests for
sanctions against school districts are rare.
108
Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 32 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUC. L. REP. at 410.
109
Id. at 129; see CAL. CODE REGS. 5 § 3088 (a), (c); CAL. GOV’T CODE §
11455.20(a) (West 1997).
110
Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 32 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUC. L. REP. at 410.
111
Id. at 411 (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 2000)).
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not find that such obstructive actions were taken by the district and
denied the motion for sanctions.112
VIII. EVALUATION: AVOIDING SANCTIONS AS A PRACTITIONER IN A
SPECIAL EDUCATION PROCEEDING
If the precedents outlined above demonstrate anything, it is
that parent attorneys and pro se parents bringing due process hearing
requests ought to be especially careful of the potential for sanctions
ranging from dismissals with prejudice to monetary sanctions or
exclusion of evidence. Of the fourteen cases discussed above, twelve
involved sanctions against the parent-party and/or their
representatives. Although this cannot be viewed as a trend by any
means, given the fact that many ALJ decisions are unpublished, it is
telling of the type of sanctioning authority granted to ALJs across
various states under each state’s interpretation of IDEA.
Given the relatively loose structure of the due process hearing
in special education under IDEA, ALJs have attempted to utilize state
regulations and cases defining sanctioning authority from other states
to find ways to curb abuse of the process by attorneys or pro se
parents. Generally, procedural requirements, such as timing for
filings of documents in evidence, appearances before the ALJ, or the
filing of the due process request multiple times, are of particular
concern to ALJs, as evidenced by the cases discussed in the
preceding sections. The cases described in this Article provide
overwhelming support for the authority of ALJs to sanction parties in
a proceeding. Appellate review of these decisions whether by a
second-tier reviewer or a state or federal judge has resulted in
upholding the discretionary authority of the lower-level ALJ in
nearly all instances.
Legal practitioners ought not mistake the informality of the
system set up under IDEA as laxity. They ought to treat the process
with the same respect and care as they would a proceeding before a
court of law. Given the potential for prejudice to their claims, pro se
parents and representatives ought to be especially cautious when
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Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 32 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUC. L. REP. at 411.
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bringing a due process claim.113 A due process hearing request
requires due diligence, effective communication throughout the
process, compliance with judicial orders, and cooperation with
opposing counsel to prevent the issuance of a sanction against them
for procedural misconduct. School district attorneys are most
experienced with these types of proceedings and this may be why
examples of sanctions against them were less common in the survey
of cases made in this Article. However, the two examples provided
where the ALJ contemplates disciplinary sanctions against counsel
for the school district demonstrate that they too, are not immune.114
IX. CONCLUSION
This description of the sanctioning authority of special
education ALJs demonstrates relative uniformity among a number of
states in which ALJs have authority to issue disciplinary sanctions.
However, there is no agreement as to the type of sanctions within the
scope of their authority.
Indeed, this Article illustrates the
divergence of opinion on the appropriate sanction to be employed by
the ALJ. Overall, it serves as a reminder to practitioners representing
parents in special education cases and pro se parents to treat the
process with the utmost diligence, timeliness, and respect so as to
avoid potentially damaging consequences for the child seeking to
assert rights under IDEA.

For example, monetary sanctions may impact a parent’s ability to
afford to continue bringing their claim before a hearing officer.
114
See supra sections V, Refusal to Admit Facts or Documents into
Evidence, and VII, Contempt Sanctions for Failure to Comply with Due Process
Decisions.
113
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